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Abstract—Reliability of electrical transmission systems is
presently managed by applying the deterministic N-1 criterion, or
some variant thereof. This means that transmission systems are
designed with at least one level of redundancy, regardless of the
cost of doing so, or the severity of the risks they mitigate. In an
operational context, the N-1 criterion provides a reliability target
but it fails to accurately capture the dynamic nature of short-
term threats to transmission systems. Ongoing research aims to
overcome this shortcoming by proposing new probabilistic reli-
ability criteria. Such new criteria are anticipated to rely heavily
on component failure rate calculations. This paper provides a
threat modelling framework, using the Icelandic transmission
system as an example, highlighting the need for improved data
collection and failure rate modelling. The feasibility of using
threat credibility indicators to achieve spatio-temporal failure
rates, given minimal data, is explored in a case study of the
Icelandic transmission system. The paper closes with a discussion
on the assumptions and simplifications that are implicitly made
in the formulation, and the additional work required for such
an approach to be included in existing practices. Specifically,
this paper is concerned only with short term and real-time
management of electrical transmission systems.
Keywords—failure rates; threat credibility indicators; power
system operation; spatio-temporal risk; reliability management;
I. INTRODUCTION
Electrical transmission systems are becoming more difficult
to control given the installation of dynamic devices, a grow-
ing share of distributed generation in the energy mix, the
liberalisation of energy markets, and reduced investment in
new transmission infrastructure [1]. Operators are forced to
drive the system closer to its limits, in order to provide the
expected level of service, requiring more operational risks to
be accepted.
Current practice in managing risk relies upon the N-1 crite-
rion, such that system operators aim to maintain a reasonable
level of service after the potential loss of any single major
component (e.g. a transmission line, generator, transformer, or
bus bar). The N-1 criterion is enforced by some regulators and
is discussed within ENTSO-E policies [2]. The application of
this criterion by transmission system operators (TSOs) varies
due to different interpretations and system risks. However, the
N-1 criterion does not adequately mitigate threats associated
with exogenous phenomena (e.g. weather), system protection
failure, common failure modes of multiple components, and
uncertainty in load and renewable generation forecasts. It also
fails to consider the likelihood and consequences of faults
occurring [3], treating all N-1 faults with equal importance.
Risks that aren’t mitigated by the N-1 criterion alone tend to be
indirectly assessed and managed through a range of tools (e.g.
dynamic simulations, energy management systems, SCADA,
WAMS) and operator experience [1].This can be defined as a
Reliability Management Approach and Criterion (RMAC).
In order to upgrade TSO procedures to include probabilistic
RMACs, such as those proposed in [4]–[12], there is a need
to upgrade TSO data collection and modelling. Ideally, the
data collection and models should allow the TSO to estimate
the likelihood and consequence (i.e. risk) of all threats to
which the system is vulnerable, at least those dependent upon
exogenous variables. Specifically, there is a need to improve
data collection and modelling of failure rates, and hence fault
probabilities, for both short and long term risk assessments.
This paper investigates the data and modelling requirements
for calculation of failure rates on the Icelandic transmission
system, by providing a framework for threat based failure
rates. This is done by exploiting the link between the oc-
currence of contingencies and specific threats to the system,
given that some threats are somewhat predictable. The main
operational threats are described and categorised, with a brief
review of existing models and their data requirements. The
data requirements to model these threats are then compared
with existing data collection, to suggest why stochastic models
are not already in wide-spread use. Methods of estimating
contingency probabilities as a function of credible threats are
then described, and briefly investigated for part of the Icelandic
transmission system.
II. LINKING THREATS AND FAILURE RATES
Probabilistic RMACs that have been proposed in litera-
ture [4] deal with both discrete contingencies (e.g. line faults)
and continuous uncertainty (e.g. load forecast error, variability
of renewable generation). The operation of the transmission
system is then optimised to mitigate the risks associated with
discrete and continuous uncertainty. The cause of the events
within the discrete contingency set, and the calculation of their
probabilities, is not often elaborated on [13]–[15]. It is often
assumed that the probability of a contingency occurring is
constant; calculated from historical fault data. The Nordic grid
disturbance statistics suggest that failure rates/probabilities are
not constant, given that they vary month by month due to the
seasonality of specific threats [16]. Section 2 discusses this
link, and proposes a framework for describing contingency
probabilities as a function of threats and their individual failure
rate models.
A. Main operational threats
Threats to electrical transmission systems are defined in [17]
as ”any indication, circumstance, or event with the potential
to disrupt or destroy critical infrastructure, or any element
thereof”. A threat can be categorized as a natural (exogenous)
threat, human error, sabotage, or technical [18]. The proba-
bility of a threat causing damage to a system depends upon
the system’s susceptibility to the particular threat [15]. When
a threat has been realised, it can be described as the ”primary
cause” of a fault [19].
A study by [20] describes the natural threats to the Icelandic
electrical transmission system. These are listed below, along
with some additional credible exogenous threats:
∙ Wind (galloping)












∙ Human error (random)
∙ Human error (control errors)
∙ Human error (due to proximity of planned work)
∙ Sabotage
∙ Technical
∙ Other (unknown/invisible cause)
The realisation of most of these threats depends upon some
prevailing, observable environmental conditions. It is unlikely
to have a failure due to snow accumulation in the middle of
summer, or a structural failure due to wind loading on a calm
day. Therefore, given a combination of data measurement and
modelling, it should be possible to anticipate faults due to
some of these threats or rule some of these threats out for
particular time intervals. The considered elimination of threats
should improve operator awareness of system risk, and hence
their ability to calculate the likelihood of faults.
For an extended list of threats considered within each
of the Nordic transmission systems, refer to the appendix
of [19]. Major threats to the Portuguese system are looked
at comprehensively in [13], [21], [22].
Human error involves the random failure of one or more
components due to physical damage (i.e. during maintenance
or adjacent construction) or by incorrect control (accidentally
switching the state of a component). Trivially, the occurrence
of human error depends on the presence of humans [23].
Therefore, all controllable components are only at risk of
human errors due to incorrect control. All other components
are at risk of physical damage due to human error when
humans are present. Therefore, knowledge of maintenance
activities or nearby construction can be used as an input for a
model to anticipate random human error.
Literature on antagonistic damage to electrical power sys-
tems is largely based upon attacker-defender simulations, with
a heavy emphasis on game theory and trying to find optimal
defence strategies in response to different attack strategies.
The probability of sabotage is not easily calculated given
the classified nature of data related to the subject. Sabotage
of transmission systems may also take the form of cyber-
attacks [24]. In general, some latent possibility of sabotage can
be modelled by increasing the failure rate of all components
slightly, as done with human error. Possibly with adjustment
factors based on the accessibility of the component to the
public, its visibility, and its perceived (or actual) importance
to the system. Alternatively sabotage may be modelled by
considering an informed attacker who optimises their attack
to maximise consequences, given some finite resources (e.g.
manpower) [25].
Technical failures can be described as those that occur due
to continued use and wear of components, or due to hidden
damage of components. They occur due to no apparent forcing
by exogenous variables at the time of failure. When potential
for a technical failure is observed, it is normally corrected
through maintenance activities. Therefore, given adequate
observation and maintenance, any residual risk of technical
failure must be due to hidden or irreparable damage. Under the
assumption of perfect maintenance, technical failures can be
considered to have a constant failure rate [25]. However, it may
be argued that a component operated close to its limits is more
likely to undergo a technical failure than one that is lightly-
loaded. Significant literature exists on linking maintenance,
component age and component health to failure rates, but is
not discussed in this paper.
B. TSO modelling of failure rates
No stochastic models related to operational risks are
presently used for system operation in Iceland. This is due
to a combination of the following reasons:
∙ A lack of proven economic value in updating existing
practices
∙ Intuitive approach is currently fit-for-purpose
∙ Low confidence in the accuracy of some models
∙ Distrust of black-box models
∙ Models still considered to be in research and development
phase
As discussed in [3], TSOs commonly test that their system
can survive N-1 or even N-1-1 faults (occurrence of two
independent N-1 events) without significant loss of load. A
number of probabilistic risk-assessment tools are already being
developed and tested by various TSOs in planning and opera-
tion [1]. The Nordic countries collect and share fault statistics,
and categorise faults by a number of causes [16]. Using these
fault statistics, some Nordic TSOs and DSOs (Distribution
System Operators) calculate historical failure rates for use in
the Promaps reliability software package, described in [26],
[27].
Another common use of fault statistics is to calculate multi-
level failure rates, where the failure rate is separated into
a ”normal weather” failure rate and a number of ”severe
weather” failure rates, as described in [28]–[33]. This approach
is generally used for planning longer term activities and not
used within the short-term or real-time operational contexts.
As stated in [34], the resolution of this approach might not
be sufficient for operational purposes but it should suffice for
long-term planning. It should be noted that ”severe weather” is
not a specific threat, but describes a broad environmental state
in which some subset of threats become credible and more
likely. Such an approach cannot distinguish between a storm
that may cause icing and a storm that may cause line to line
faults due to galloping, landslides or lightning strikes.
In a general sense the N-1 approach to reliability considers
the vulnerability of the system without considering the specific
threats to the system. It assumes that any component is
capable of experiencing a fault at any time, without any
consideration of how this may occur. Specific, high impact
low probability (HILP) threats, such as sabotage and severe
natural disasters, are generally considered as scenarios which
are specifically prepared for using expert knowledge. On the
Icelandic transmission system, outages due to storms are
normally mitigated through expert knowledge and intuitive
understanding of how a storm will affect outage probabilities.
Despite the acknowledgement of a link between the likelihood
of threats and the likelihood of contingencies, failure rates are
not currently described in terms of specific threats.
C. Framework for threat based failure rates
The approach proposed by this paper is to use observational
data and stochastic models to calculate the likelihood of fail-
ure, conditional on specific threats. Doing so will allow failure
rates to be variable in the context of short-term transmission
system operation. This approach is described by Fig. 1. This
draws inspiration from the ideas discussed in [13], [18], [21],
[35], putting such approaches into a generalized framework.
For a given component, there is some finite set of threats
which may lead to failure. Those which can be discerned by
the TSO are defined generally as visible threats whilst those
that aren’t are defined as invisible threats (equivalent to the
”other” primary cause listed in the Nordic fault statistics [19]).
Within the set of visible threats a particular threat may be
























Fig. 1. Framework for the choice of a specific failure rate model given the
nature of the threat, and the availability of data and trustworthy models
predictable or not. A predictable threat is one that, given some
observational data, an expert can determine whether it is more
or less likely for a fault due to the threat to occur. Those
which are unpredictable can also be considered as invisible
threats within the context of calculating failure rates, as they
are essentially random. This is also the case for predictable
threats for which the relevant data is not collected, as although
it could be visible, it is invisible to the TSO due to the lack of
data. All invisible threats must be lumped into a single random
threat for which there is a constant failure rate, similar to how
all threats are treated by TSOs at present.
A predictable threat for which the relevant data is observed
may have an associated stochastic model. For example, a pre-
dictive model of icing on transmission lines may be based on
temperature, wind and humidity data. Although such models
exist, they may not be adopted by TSOs due to issues with
verifying the model (i.e. lack of historical data) or a lack of
trust in the model.
The proposed framework contains the present day approach
(all threats are considered as invisible), outlines the require-
ments to transition to full stochastic modelling, and suggests
a discrete logic model as an intermediate step to overcome a
lack of historical data. This framework allows for a gradual
transition towards the ideal approach of spatio-temporally
variable failure rates.
1) Data set description: We presuppose there exists a finite
set of 𝑀 independent and mutually exclusive threats defined
by Ψ = {𝜓1, ..., 𝜓𝑀}. Furthermore, for a given component
and an observational period of [0, 𝑇 ] we define a dataset, 𝐹 ,
of 𝑁 observed failures as:
𝐹 = {(𝑡1, 𝜓1), ..., (𝑡𝑁 , 𝜓𝑁 )},
where ∀𝑖 : 𝑡𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑇 ] and 𝜓𝑖 ∈ Ψ. (1)
The pair (𝑡𝑖, 𝜓𝑖) is interpreted as meaning that a failure
occurred at some time 𝑡𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑇 ] and its root cause was
attributed to threat 𝜓𝑖. It should be noted that no information
regarding outage duration is used, even if this information is
recorded in practice.
Given this data set, 𝐹 , we denote by 𝑥𝑡 a time-series of
failures, defined as 𝑥𝑡 = 1 whenever 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑖 for some failure
occurrence 𝑖 in 𝐹 , and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we denote by
𝑥𝑘,𝑡 the time-series of failures attributed to threat 𝜓𝑘, defined
as 𝑥𝑘,𝑡 = 1 whenever 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑖 and 𝜓𝑖 = 𝜓𝑘 within 𝐹 and
0 otherwise. Note that 𝑥𝑡 =
∑
𝜓𝑘∈Ψ 𝑥𝑘,𝑡, since at most one
failure may occur at any moment in time, and can only be
attributed to a single threat. We furthermore denote by
∑
𝑡 𝑥𝑘,𝑡





𝑡 𝑥𝑘,𝑡 = 𝑁 .
For the purpose of modelling component failure rates,
we decompose our set of all possible threats, Ψ, into three
mutually exclusive and exhaustive subsets of threats, denoted
respectively by Ψ𝑢, Ψ𝑣 , and Ψ𝑑, where:
∙ the subset Ψ𝑢 contains the unpredictable threats whose
induced failures will be modelled by a constant failure
rate;
∙ the subset Ψ𝑣 contains those threats whose induced
failures will be modelled by a variable failure rate;
∙ the subset Ψ𝑑 contains those threats whose induced
failures will be modelled by a discrete logic model.
For the remainder of this document, the indices {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘} are
used to represent a specific threat that is contained within Ψ𝑢,
Ψ𝑣 , or Ψ𝑑, respectively.
2) Constant failure rate model: For an unpredictable threat
𝜓𝑖 ∈ Ψ𝑢, we assume a constant threat-specific failure rate,






This is simply a statistical mean rate of failure and would
be expected to equal the true failure rate given a long enough
period of time.
3) Continuous failure rate models: For those threats 𝜓𝑗 ∈
Ψ𝑣 that are modelled by general (possibly continuous) failure
rate models, we denote by 𝜆𝑗(𝜉𝑡) their failure rate function,
where 𝜉𝑡 is an observation or forecast of one or more exoge-
nous variables at time 𝑡. We do not elaborate on the types of
functional dependencies, nor on the procedures for estimating
their parameters from the available data set 𝑥𝑗,𝑡. An example
of a continuous model for transmission system reliability is
discussed in [36], where the failure rate is a linear function of
temperature and wind speed, although this particular example
does not describe a threat-specific model.
For cases in which a stochastic model is not sufficient for the
calculation of failure rates (due to problems with verification
or a lack of trust in the model), the model should be simplified
as a discrete logic model.
4) Discrete logic model: For each threat 𝜓𝑘 ∈ Ψ𝑑 to be
represented by a discrete logic model, we assume that a threat
specific credibility indicator, 𝛼𝑘(𝜉𝑡) → {0, 1}, is given and
which must satisfy the following condition:
Fig. 2. Example of how observations of exogenous data can be used in
combination with inequalities and logical statements to calculate a threat
credibility indicator, and hence a threat conditional failure rate at some point
in time.
𝑥𝑘,𝑡 = 0, whenever 𝛼𝑘(𝜉𝑡) = 0. (3)
That is, a fault due to 𝜓𝑘 should only be historically
observable only when it is defined to be credible. This feature
is required for discrete logic models to be feasible. and we
model the failure rate of threat 𝜓𝑘 by:
𝜆𝑘(𝜉𝑡) = 𝜆𝑘𝛼𝑘(𝜉𝑡). (4)
In other words, the logical condition 𝛼𝑘(𝜉𝑡) = 0 is inter-
preted as meaning that the threat can not be present, while
𝛼𝑘(𝜉𝑡) = 1 means that the threat may be present. The simplest




1, for 𝜉𝑡 ≥ 𝜉𝑐 (5)
0, otherwise. (6)
Where 𝜉𝑐 defines some critical limits above which threat
𝜓𝑘 is credible. An alternate example of a discrete logic model
is shown in Fig.2, where a set of relevant observations are
treated by a combination of inequalities and logical rules. The
setting of the critical limits, 𝜉𝑐, and of the discrete logic model
may be determined by a stochastic model, machine learning,
or expert opinion. It should be noted that the threat credibility
indicator, 𝛼𝑘(𝜉𝑡), does not depend upon the fault statistics, 𝐹 ,
but instead depends only upon exogenous data.








Which is the number of failures due to the 𝑘𝑡ℎ threat
divided by the period of time for which the credibility indicator
function was active.
For some threats, there may be no historical data from
which to calculate failure rate statistics. In which case, expert
knowledge may be used to assume failure rates.
5) Sum of threat-specific failure models: If a failure rate
model is established for each threat, for a specific component,
the total failure rate at some instant in time, 𝑡, given some











The probability of occurrence of a failure within a time
frame [𝑡1, 𝑡2], is obtained:




and if the interval is short enough to consider 𝜉𝑡 as constant
over [𝑡1, 𝑡2], this reduces to:
𝜋(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = 1− 𝑒−𝜆𝑡(𝑡2−𝑡1). (10)
There is no need to use Markov models in the real-time
operational context, as within a time frame of days the
operator is interested in the probability of any fault occurring,
and not necessarily the expected proportion of component
availability to unavailability. The operator is only interested
in the first transition of a component from an operational state
to an inoperable state, how likely this is, and its potential
consequences.
6) Treatment of line segments: Transmission lines are a
special case of components in terms of threats, as a threat
may be credible only on a segment of the line, such as a
line that is exposed to high winds for only a few spans.
Experience from operators at the Icelandic TSO suggests that
if a line fails due to a particular threat, it normally occurs
in one of a few locations that are especially susceptible to
it due to local topography and line orientation. Given that
line segments are discernible from one another in this regard,
a single transmission line component model may be broken
down into a sequence of individual line segment models in
series for relevant threats. This however depends upon the
spatial resolution of both observational data and fault statistics.
The failure rate of the entire transmission line is simply the
sum of the constant failure rates at a given point in time.
D. Data requirements
Table I describes the threats to the Icelandic system within
the proposed framework, and identifies the potential to im-
prove data and modelling for individual threats. It should be
noted that for some threats, partial data may still allow for
the creation of a valid credibility indicator function. Most of
the data required is already measured by the Icelandic TSO
at present (salt measurements, reservoir levels, maintenance
crew locations), or by meteorological bureaus. However, not
all of the data is collated in a useful format, or at useful
spatial/temporal resolutions, which are practical barriers to
implementation of the proposed method. A threat is assumed
to be predictable if there exists some observable parameter
that would allow a TSO to adjust their risk assessment of
that particular threat, with enough time to react before its
occurrence (i.e. at least 15 minutes ahead).
The present data collection is minimal, and therefore it is not
possible to thoroughly implement the approach discussed in
this paper at present, despite thorough historical fault records.
Data collection activities and the development of stochastic
models can both be costly endeavours with difficult to quantify
value to the TSO. It is likely that the usefulness of the












Fig. 3. Overview of the electrical transmission system in the West Fjords,
Iceland
collection of data, either through convincing simulations or
initially using cheap low resolution/quality data. Once data
collection is under way, the development of stochastic models
can be accelerated due to the improved availability of data for
future model fitting.
It is apparent from Table I that a lack of data collection
(especially related to weather) is a significant bottleneck to
the adoption of stochastic models in practice. It is therefore
important to identify ways to overcome this bottleneck, by
justifying the costs of incremental improvements to data
acquisition and storage.
III. CASE STUDY: PART OF ICELAND
The case study demonstrates the application of the cred-
ibility indicator functions, using a segment of the Icelandic
system that is susceptible to a particular threat. This study
uses historical fault data and simulated credibility indicators
to show the effectiveness of using threat credibility indicators
compared with the present day approach. The simulated credi-
bility indicators are used in lieu of actual weather data, which
is unavailable at present.
A. Description of case study area
The least reliable region of the Icelandic transmission
system is the West Fjords, located in the country’s North
West [66], shown in Fig. 3. Of all transmission line faults
that have occurred in the region, 32% have been due to
icing, as determined using the historical fault statistics. This
region is a radial connection from the main network, consisting
of transmission lines operated at 132 kV, 66 kV and lower
voltages. The transmission shown as BV2 is an underground
cable, and therefore is not susceptible to icing.
TABLE I
MAIN THREATS TO THE ICELANDIC TRANSMISSION SYSTEM, DESCRIBED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSED THREAT MODELLING FRAMEWORK. ALL
THREATS THAT ARE DEFINED AS PREDICTABLE SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MODEL STOCHASTICALLY OR LOGICALLY. SOME ADDITIONAL THREATS MAY
BE DEFINED AS A COMBINATION OF A SUBSET OF THREATS (E.G. WIND AND ICING).
Threats Visible? Predictable? Relevant Data Data Collected Model Examples
Now Potential Used Now In Literature
Wind - Galloping Yes Yes Wind speed, wind direction, topography No Yes No [37]–[41]
Wind Structural Failure Yes Yes Wind speed, wind direction, topography No Yes No [20]
Ice loading Yes Yes Existing ice load, precipitation, temper-
ature, humidity, wind speed
Partial Yes No [42]–[48]
Lightning strikes Yes Yes Temperature, humidity, precipitation,
atmospheric voltage potential
No Yes No [49]–[53]
Earthquakes Yes No - - - - -
Landslides/avalanches Yes Yes Topography, temperature, wind speed,
wind direction, precipitation, snow
depth
No Yes No [20]
Volcanic Eruptions Yes Yes Risk indicators, seismic activity, atmo-
spheric sulphur, snow/ice melting, to-
pography
No Yes No [54]–[56]
Glacial floods (jokulhlaup) Yes Yes Topography, seismic activity No Yes No [57]–[59]
Snow accumulation Yes Yes Precipitation, snow depth No Yes No [60]–[62]
Salt pollution Yes Yes Salt measurements, wind speed, wind
direction
Partial Yes No [63]
Generator/load failure Yes No - - - - -
Solar flares Yes Yes Solar flare warnings No Yes No [64], [65]
Human error (random) Yes No - - - - -
Human error (control) Yes No - - - - -
Human error (proximity) Yes Yes Maintenance crew locations, public
work notifications
Yes Yes No -
Sabotage Yes No - - - - -
Technical Yes No - - - - -
Other No No - - - - -
B. Threat modelling
It is assumed that icing events can only occur from August
to March, based on historical fault data provided by the
Icelandic TSO. It is also assumed that within these 8 months,
icing faults are credible for 20% of the time (equivalent to
1170 hours per year). These assumptions are based on operator
experience, and are made due to a lack of historical weather
and icing data. For simplicity, all other threats are considered
as invisible threats. Given the Icelandic fault statistics, which
provide a time series of faults categorized by their root cause
(𝑥𝑘), and the above assumption that icing is credible 20% of
8 months of the year (∑𝛼𝑘 = (0.2)( 812 )𝑇 ), the conditional
failure rates due to icing (𝜓𝑘) can be calculated by (7).
The residual failure rate, 𝜆𝑟, capturing failures due to
all other possible threats (and which are considered as









The failure rate of each component at some point in time
can then be calculated using (8) as:
𝜆𝑡 = 𝜆𝑟 + 𝜆𝑘𝛼𝑘(𝜉𝑡). (12)
For the case study, the resulting failure rates are shown in
Fig. 4, alongside the original failure rates. These failure rates
are based on 30 years of fault records collected at the Icelandic
TSO. The relevant information included in these records
include failure time, duration, component, and a description
of the root cause and nature of the fault.
The lack of historical weather data makes it difficult to
realistically simulate a storm. Therefore credibility indicator
values are assumed to describe a storm moving across the West
Fjords region, over the course of a day, gradually affecting
the transmission lines from the NW to the SE. For simplicity,
weather is considered to affect either the whole of the line or
not at all. The simulation is run hourly, over the course of a
day, with the storm affecting the lines in the manner described
by Table II.
C. Hourly fault probability
For the assumed storm and credibility function accuracy,
the hourly probability of one or more faults in the region
was calculated. This is shown in Fig. 5, with the existing
method (constant failure rate) shown for comparison. The use
of component specific threat credibility indicators results in
spatio-temporal failure rates, and allows for the risk associated
with a particular storm to be quantified and visualised. The






































Fig. 4. Transmission line failure rates, with the standard failure rate compared
with the failure rates that are conditional on the credibility of icing.
TABLE II
HOURLY CREDIBILITY OF ICING THREATS IN THE WEST FJORDS DUE TO A
STORM MOVING OVER THE REGION
Transmission Lines Hours of credible icing threat (𝜉𝑡 ≥ 𝜉𝑐)
BV1 and IF1 2 to 14
BD1 5 to 17
TA1 and MJ1 7 to 19
GE1 9 to 21
GL1 12 to 24
BV2 icing not credible (underground cable)
Fjords region for the duration of the simulated storm is 12.3%,
which is more than double the accumulated probability when
using a constant failure rate (5.9%). The spatial variability of
fault probabilities is not shown, as it simply follows the timing
shown in Table II, proportional to the conditional failure rates
shown in Fig. 4.
An interesting outcome of using threat credibility indicators,
is that the failure probability in the region decreases below
the probability calculated using existing methods (i.e. constant
failure rate for the entire year), given that the probability of
icing faults is zero. That is, in this case study, periods in which
icing is not credible allow for 32% of faults to be removed
from the fault statistics hence leading to a lower failure rate.
This implies that current practice of constant year-round failure
rates over-estimate fault probabilities in calm summer periods.
D. Model sensitivity
Fig. 6 shows the relationship between the accuracy of
the credibility function and the hourly failure probability,
for the simulated 24 hour period. Trivially, Fig. 6 shows
that assuming icing threats are credible 100% of the time
is equivalent to using a single, constant failure rate. This
implicitly assumes that icing is an invisible, unpredictable
threat, which is contrary to expert opinion. It is therefore
important to define a credibility function that can exclude as
great a proportion of time as possible. The choice of models
Hour
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Fig. 5. The probability of one or more faults at each hour of the simulation,
equivalent to the complement of the probability of all components surviving
each hour
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Fig. 6. Sensitivity of the simulated logical failure rate model to the tightness
of the credibility indicator function. A tight credibility indicator function
means one which is active for a minimal proportion of the year.
or rules which inform credibility indicators must be trusted by
operators, and verifiable with data, if the outcome is to be of
any use in real-time operation. It is anticipated that it is easier
to gain the trust of operators with the simple, binary rules
of credibility indicators, than with the continuous regression
models proposed in the literature to date.
IV. DISCUSSION
In the context of the proposed framework, outlined by Fig.
1, most TSOs make the implicit assumption that all threats
are invisible by using constant failure rates. State of the art
literature concentrates on continuous, regression-based models
to connect failure rates to exogenous variables, but requires
historical data that TSOs don’t necessarily possess and may
not be trusted by operators. The proposed logical modelling
method, which relies on threat credibility indicators, may over-
come these issues and would allow TSOs to implement spatio-
temporal failure rates into their RMAC. They would also
encourage TSOs to begin collecting data in order to tighten the
credibility indicator functions, without requiring a pre-existing
database of exogenous data. This may eventually lead to TSOs
possessing the data required to develop and implement the
regressive continuous models already discussed in literature.
Therefore the proposed modelling framework and technique
may provide a pathway for the eventual implementation of
more robust stochastic models in practice.
If a TSO were to transition towards a probabilistic RMAC
without considering the effects of exogenous factors on failure
probabilities, their approach would overlook a substantial
source of system risk in an operational context. There is a
need to quantify threats before they are realised, such that
they can be adequately addressed in a preventative, rather
than corrective, manner. Until threat based failure rates are
modelled and adopted, a TSO using a probabilistic RMAC
must rely solely on operator intuition to react to dynamic
threats to the system.
In an operational context, it is not expected that implement-
ing spatio-temporal failure rates will affect decision making
(the choice of control actions) significantly, but rather confirm
what is already intuitively known by operators. The proposed
modelling method provides a way of quantifying what is
already described/used qualitatively, and may be used to help
operators and TSOs justify the outcomes of their decision
making process.
V. CONCLUSION
There is growing pressure on TSOs to operate their system
closer to the limits, and doing so requires TSOs to be increas-
ingly aware of these limits in real time. TSOs currently rely on
operator experience and judgement to manage the short-term
threats to the system, the likelihood of these threats leading to
a failure, and the severity of their occurrence. Quantifying the
risks to the transmission system is an active topic of research,
and this paper suggests a pathway to transition from static
failure rates towards more complex models. The success of
such a transition relies on long-term, consistent data collection.
The use of the suggested method is justified by the case-
study which uses fault information from a European TSO and
shows how the use of simple logical rules can improve the
quantification of the transmission system’s reliability.
Further research required on this topic will be in defining
trustworthy credibility indicators for threats, combining the
method with consequence modelling (calculation of expected
lost load) and showing its potential to drive decision making,
proving the practical accuracy of credibility indicators using
real weather data, and comparing the efficacy of logical models
with continuous models.
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